Your vendor risk program is a joke. You're collecting paperwork but not reducing risk. Those questionnaires and certifications you're hoarding are only giving you a false sense of security while your critical vendors are creating backdoors into your systems.
DORA changes everything. Regulators aren't asking if you’ve done the work anymore. They're also demanding proof that your vendors, especially those handling your crown jewels, are secure at a technical level. And no, that SOC 2 report collecting dust in your SharePoint won't save you when attackers move through your supply chain.
You know the drill. Send a questionnaire, wait weeks for responses, check if they have SOC 2, then rubber-stamp the approval. Congratulations, you've done absolutely nothing to reduce actual risk.
Vendors tell you what you want to hear, and you pretend to believe them. Meanwhile, their API keys are hardcoded in GitHub, their S3 buckets are public, and their developers are pushing code without reviews.
Remember when SolarWinds did everything right? Their customers did too. Then attackers compromised their build system and pushed malicious code to 18,000 organizations. Paperwork didn't stop that breach, but technical validation would have.
Checklists confirm that a policy exists; they don’t confirm the policy works. A vendor can pass SOC 2 Type II and still:
None of that shows up in a generic questionnaire. It shows up when you review architecture, roles/permissions, logging coverage, and real incidents.
I’ve worked with a payments fintech company that integrated a SaaS analytics tool via OAuth with broad read/write scopes. The vendor had ISO 27001 and SOC 2; due diligence was a 300-question survey plus the reports. Months later, the vendor’s build system leaked an access token. An attacker used the vendor’s integration to query transactions and trigger a small set of fraudulent refunds - no direct breach of the fintech’s systems, but real loss and reporting obligations.
Here’s what the paperwork missed:
A deep review would have forced least-privilege scopes, verified vendor build-pipeline controls, required joined telemetry (IdP, API, workload), and set audit-log delivery expectations in the contract.
Compliance frameworks are the minimum baseline. They tell you if a vendor met a standard at a specific point in time, but not if they're secure today.
Under DORA, you must demonstrate operational resilience across your ICT supply chain. That means you:
In short, regulators are asking for evidence that you can see, manage, and recover from third-party failures.
DORA expects you to prove (continuously) that the vendors behind your critical or important functions are controlled, monitored, and replaceable without breaking your business. That means moving from annual audits to live oversight, backed by contracts that give you evidence on demand and the rights to test, audit, and exit.
That yearly vendor assessment you're so proud of? It's obsolete the moment you complete it. DORA demands continuous monitoring of your critical vendors, especially those providing ICT services.
Article 28 is explicit: manage ICT third-party risk as part of your ICT risk management, keep the register current, and ensure you can demonstrate control effectiveness across the relationship lifecycle. And make sure to treat this like operational telemetry. If a vendor supports a critical or important function, your oversight has to be continuous and risk-based.
Your current quarterly or annual review cycle just simply won’t work anymore. By the time you detect a vendor vulnerability through traditional methods, chances are, attackers have already been exploiting it for months.
Article 30 requires contracts that grant you rights to information, access, audits, security metrics, incident notifications, service levels, data location/portability, sub-outsourcing visibility, and termination/exit. Use those rights to obtain logs, test recovery, and validate least-privilege access in real environments, then measure it on a cadence. Supervisors and recent ECB guidance expect this level of proof, especially for cloud.
What good looks like:
Your biggest providers amplify risk because they sit in the middle of many critical or important processes. DORA expects you to quantify and control concentration risk - can you substitute them, move data, and keep operating if they fail? Treat this as a business-continuity problem with technical proof, instead of as a sourcing preference.
Article 29 requires a preliminary assessment of ICT concentration risk before you add or expand a provider: substitutability, portability, and the blast radius if the service fails. EU supervisors have doubled down on this, highlighting the dependency on a small set of hyperscalers and the need for realistic exit and fallback options. Build, test, and document those paths now.
The bigger the vendor, the deeper your review should go. These providers have access to your crown jewels, and their security directly impacts yours.
For cloud providers, this means:
For payment processors:
For AI providers:
Forget your checklist. Deep vendor reviews require technical validation, threat modeling, and hands-on testing.
Your biggest providers amplify risk because they sit in the middle of many critical or important processes. DORA expects you to quantify and control concentration risk - can you substitute them, move data, and keep operating if they fail? Treat this as a business-continuity problem with technical proof, instead of as a sourcing preference.
Ask for short and targeted walkthroughs with the vendor’s engineers. Review how identities and data are handled, not just the policy text. Focus on:
Here's what a real deep-dive review includes:
Authentication & Authorization
Data Protection
Infrastructure Security
Treat each vendor as another subsystem in your architecture. If their component fails or is abused, where can an attacker go next?
Start by mapping how data flows between your systems and the vendor's. This reveals attack paths and trust boundaries that questionnaires miss.
Key questions to answer:
The most vulnerable points are where your systems connect. Focus your security testing here:
Rigorous security testing doesn't have to damage vendor relationships. Frame it as risk reduction for both parties, and not an adversarial audit.
Anything you install or link is your attack surface.
Run scenario tests in the vendor’s sandbox or a ring-fenced tenant you control. Agree the scope and success criteria up front.
What you keep as evidence
Deep vendor reviews only work if they’re built into how your teams ship software. If reviews live in spreadsheets and ad-hoc meetings, you’ll miss risk signals, burn time on manual checks, and struggle to prove oversight under DORA. The fix is operational: automate the signals, wire reviews into engineering workflows, and report outcomes in a way leadership and regulators trust.
Annual reviews won’t catch a leaked key or a new critical CVE. You need continuous signals tied to the vendors that power your critical functions, with clear owners and thresholds for action.
Stand up always-on feeds that map to each vendor and integration. Track identity, code, and infrastructure signals that indicate real exposure, not just noise. Route alerts to the owning team with runbooks for contain→investigate→remediate.
Operational outcomes to target
AI can read vendor docs, extract control claims, compare against your standards, and flag gaps. It can also correlate logs across your estate and the vendor’s APIs to surface anomalies. Keep humans in the loop for risk decisions.
Where AI helps
Guardrails
Security reviews shouldn't be isolated from engineering processes. Integrate them into existing workflows for better adoption.
Make the first conversation with a vendor productive and repeatable. Your template should capture the minimum evidence to assess risk and set expectations for ongoing monitoring.
Template essentials
Treat vendor code and connections like any other change to production.
Actions to bake in
Leadership needs clarity on exposure and progress. Supervisors need proof of control effectiveness. Build reporting off the same data you use to operate, then frame it for each audience.
Create metrics that matter:
These metrics should show progress because leadership needs to see how vendor security impacts business risk.
Document your vendor security program to satisfy DORA requirements:
What your audit pack should include
What matters now is showing that you understand your dependencies at a technical level and can prove you’ve built defenses around them. Done right, deep vendor reviews reduce the chance of cascading failures, cut the cost of incident response, and give your board and regulators confidence that you’re in control.
Your ability to manage third-party risk is now a board-level and regulatory expectation, instead of just another security best practice.
And if you want a head start, SecurityReview.ai maps vendor risks directly to DORA compliance requirements, turning technical findings into regulator-ready reports. That way, you can focus on real risk reduction while proving defensible oversight.
Keep up with attackers and auditors, and start looking deeper at your vendors now.
DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act) is an EU regulation that requires financial institutions to demonstrate resilience across their technology supply chains. It matters for vendor risk management because it shifts the expectation from checking certifications to proving that critical vendors are secure at a technical level.
Traditional programs often rely on questionnaires, SOC 2 reports, or ISO certifications. Under DORA, this is not enough. Firms must continuously monitor vendors, validate technical controls like authentication and encryption, and prove they can recover if a vendor fails.
Compliance checks verify whether a policy or certification exists. Security assurance under DORA means showing that vendor controls work in practice and that your organization can detect, respond, and recover from third-party incidents.
The main benefits are reduced risk of cascading vendor failures, faster incident response, lower regulatory penalties, and stronger board-level confidence. Deep reviews also help avoid costly disruptions caused by supply chain attacks.
A deep review validates controls at the engineering level. It includes checking how the vendor handles authentication, authorization, encryption, tenant isolation, monitoring, and incident response. It also involves mapping vendor data flows into your systems and testing high-risk integration points.
Treat vendors as part of your architecture. Map data flows, APIs, and shared identities. Identify where attackers could move between your environment and the vendor’s. Then define controls such as least-privilege scopes, audit logging, and anomaly detection to reduce exposure.
DORA expects continuous oversight, not annual reviews. That means real-time monitoring for leaked credentials, new vulnerabilities, or vendor-originated anomalies. Critical vendors require the highest frequency of technical assurance.
Vendors that underpin critical or important functions such as cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP), SaaS platforms, payment processors, and AI providers. These represent systemic risk and require deeper contractual rights, technical validation, and tested exit strategies.
DORA requires institutions to assess and mitigate ICT concentration risk. This means evaluating substitutability, portability, and the systemic impact of relying on a small number of providers. Regulators expect tested fallback and exit plans.
Review whether current vendor assessments go beyond paperwork. Prioritize deep reviews for high-criticality providers. Automate continuous monitoring for risk signals. Align contracts with Article 30 requirements for audit, evidence, and sub-outsourcing. Build defensible reporting that shows oversight and resilience.